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       NOT PRECEDENTIAL  
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 12-1341 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
JHIRMAL DAY, 
Appellant 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
District Court No. 2-05-cr-00482-002 
District Judge: The Honorable Legrome D. Davis 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 18, 2013 
 
Before: SMITH, GREENAWAY, JR., and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
 
(Filed: March 27, 2013) 
___________________ 
 
OPINION 
___________________ 
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge. 
 
In 2006, defendant Jhirmal Day pleaded guilty to interstate robbery offenses 
and was sentenced to 72 months‟ imprisonment, followed by a 3-year term of 
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supervised release.  Day‟s term of supervised release commenced in March 2010.  
Although Day voluntarily participated in the “Supervision to Aid Reentry” (STAR) 
program, which provided more intensive supervision and training, Day still had 
difficulty meeting the conditions of his supervised release.  
In June 2011, the Government petitioned to revoke Day‟s supervised release 
because of six Grade C violations:  (1) Day was arrested for knowingly possessing 
a controlled substance; (2) he repeatedly failed to submit monthly supervision 
reports to his probation officer; (3) he repeatedly submitted urine specimens that 
tested positive for marijuana; (4) he failed to attend drug treatment as directed, and 
he failed to submit regular urine samples for drug testing; (5) he failed to make any 
payments toward his restitution; and (6) he failed to notify his probation officer 
when he changed addresses.  As a result of these violations, a warrant was issued 
for his arrest in June 2011; Day was subsequently arrested on October 18, 2011.   
Day‟s revocation hearing was held on January 26, 2012.   Day faced a 
statutory maximum of 24 months‟ and an advisory guideline range of 5 to 11 
months‟ imprisonment for the Grade C violations.  The United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania revoked Day‟s term of supervised 
release and imposed the statutory-maximum sentence of 24 months‟ imprisonment.  
The Court ultimately denied Day‟s request for a sentence at the top of the advisory 
guideline range because the Court found that Day did not put forth any effort while 
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on supervised release that would warrant the Court‟s continued trust.  
Subsequently, Day filed a timely appeal of the sentence.  
On appeal, Day contends that the District Court committed procedural error 
by failing to adequately consider the relevant sentencing factors.  Day also 
contends that the sentence was greater than necessary to achieve the purposes of 
sentencing and should be remanded for resentencing.  Because the sentence was 
both procedurally and substantively reasonable, we will affirm the judgment of the 
District Court.
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This Court reviews a sentence imposed upon a revocation of supervised 
release for abuse of discretion.  United States v. Doe, 617 F.3d 766, 769 (3d Cir. 
2010).  We must ensure that the sentence was both procedurally and substantively 
reasonable.  See id. at 769-70.  First, for a sentence to be procedurally reasonable 
in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3583(3), the record must demonstrate that the 
sentencing court gave meaningful consideration to the factors set forth in 
§ 3553(a).  United States v. Bungar, 478 F.3d 540, 543-44 (3d Cir. 2007).  
However, the sentencing court does not need to “discuss and make findings as to 
each of the § 3553(a) factors if the record makes clear the court took the factors 
into account in sentencing.”  Id. at 543.  Second, if the district court‟s procedures 
                                              
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  This Court has jurisdiction 
under both 28 U.S.C. § 1291, as an appeal from a final decision of a district court, and 18 
U.S.C. § 3742(a), as an appeal of a sentence imposed under the Sentencing Reform Act 
of 1984. 
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were reasonable, we then review the substantive reasonableness of the sentence.  
Id.  When reviewing for substantive reasonableness, we must consider the totality 
of the circumstances and whether the sentence “falls within the broad range of 
possible sentences that [could] be considered reasonable.”  United States v. Wise, 
515 F.3d 207, 218 (3d Cir. 2008).  This Court‟s review for substantive 
reasonableness, however, is highly deferential, and we will affirm “„unless no 
reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that 
particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided.‟”  Doe, 617 F.3d at 
770 (quoting United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc)).  
The party challenging the sentence has the burden of demonstrating the sentence‟s 
unreasonableness.  Bungar, 478 F.3d at 543.     
In this case, the 24-month sentence was procedurally reasonable because the 
District Court expressly and thoroughly considered the relevant § 3553(a) factors.  
First, the sentencing-hearing transcript demonstrates that the District Court 
accounted for Day‟s history and characteristics, as well as the nature and 
circumstances of his Grade C violations.  The District Court, for example, 
acknowledged that Day was not an “evil, malicious man.”  But the District Court 
ultimately characterized Day‟s tenure on supervised release as an “unbroken record 
of abysmal failure” because he did not do “a single thing” the Court asked of him.  
Second, the District Court considered the need for the sentence imposed.  The 
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Court explained that it would have imposed an even longer prison term to sanction 
Day‟s significant breach of trust if it were possible to do so.  Third, the District 
Court adequately considered the relevant guideline range for a Grade C violation 
of supervised release.  During the sentencing hearing, the Court explicitly 
acknowledged that the correct guideline range was 5 to 11 months.  Fourth, the 
District Court directly relied on the Sentencing Guideline policy statements for a 
revocation of supervised release.  It correctly acknowledged that the Sentencing 
Guidelines advise the Court to impose a sentence “primarily to sanction the 
defendant‟s breach of trust” for a violation of the conditions of supervised release.  
See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 7, pt. A, introductory cmt.  The 
sentencing-hearing transcript demonstrates that the District Court carefully and 
thoroughly addressed the relevant § 3553(a) factors.  
Although Day argues that the District Court failed to adequately consider the 
relevant § 3553(a) factors, he does not point to any specific factor that the District 
Court did not address.  See Appellant Br. at 10.  As mentioned above, this Court 
has held that the sentencing court is not required to discuss and make findings as to 
each of the § 3553(a) factors.  See Bungar, 478 F.3d at 543.  Further, nothing in the 
sentencing transcript reveals that the District Court failed to adequately consider 
any of the arguments raised by Day.  Beyond the relevant § 3553(a) factors and the 
arguments raised at sentencing, the District Court “is not required to manufacture 
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grounds for the parties or search for grounds not clearly raised on the record in a 
concise and timely manner.”  United States v. Dragon, 471 F.3d 501, 505 (3d Cir. 
2006).  Therefore, Day‟s contention that the District Court did not adequately 
consider the § 3553(a) factors is baseless, and we conclude that his sentence was 
procedurally reasonable. 
Further, Day has not met the considerable burden of showing that the 
sentence was substantively unreasonable.  Day commenced supervised release in 
March 2010, and by June 2011—a little more than a year later—he had already 
committed six violations of the conditions of supervised release and had 
disappeared from law-enforcement supervision.  Besides the six Grade C 
violations, Day did not take advantage of the opportunities the Government 
provided for him for re-entry under the STAR program.  Finally, Day offered no 
colorable reason as to why his sentence should be mitigated.  Day argues that he 
should have received a reduced sentence because he made a good-faith effort to 
find and maintain employment as evidenced by the construction job he purportedly 
maintained for a month.  However, the probation officer was never able to confirm 
Day‟s employment, and Day offered no documentation of this position.  
Additionally, Day admitted that he spent all of the money he earned on clothes, 
despite the fact that he owed more than $4,000 in restitution.   
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In conclusion, Day failed to demonstrate that the District Court abused its 
discretion in imposing the 24-month statutory-maximum sentence.  Accordingly, 
we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.   
